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Abstract
Worrying is the central feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Many people worry from time to time, but in
GAD the worrying is prolonged and difficult to control. Worrying is a specific way of coping with perceived threats
and feared situations. Meanwhile, it is not considered to be a helpful coping strategy, and the phenomenological
account developed in this paper aims to show why. It builds on several phenomenological notions and in
particular on Michael Wheeler’s application of these notions to artificial intelligence and the cognitive sciences.
Wheeler emphasizes the value of ‘online intelligence’ as contrasted to ‘offline intelligence’. I discuss and apply
these concepts with respect to worrying as it occurs in GAD, suggesting that GAD patients overrate the value of
detached contemplation (offline intelligence), while underrating their embodied-embedded adaptive skills (online
intelligence). I argue that this phenomenological account does not only help explaining why worrying is used as a
coping strategy, but also why cognitive behavioral therapy is successful in treating GAD.
1. Introduction
Worrying is the core feature of generalized anxiety dis-
order (GAD) [1-4]. Many people worry from time to
time, but in GAD the worrying is prolonged and diffi-
cult to control. Worrying is a way of coping with per-
ceived threats. Yet, usually, it is not considered to be a
helpful strategy for dealing with future situations [5],
and the phenomenological account developed in this
paper aims to show why.
There are various ways to explain the prolonged and
uncontrollable worrying that occurs in GAD [2]. The
present paper, however, is restricted to an explanation
in phenomenological terms. Central to this account is to
conceive of the human being as ‘being-in-the-world’ in
the sense of an agent in continuous, embedded interac-
tion with the environment. More specifically, my
account is informed by Michael Wheeler’s application of
phenomenological (mainly Heideggerian) notions to arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) and the cognitive sciences. His
approach - in which the concept of ‘online intelligence’
is central - enables us to articulate an unhelpful
‘metacognition’ in GAD (see next section), and, more-
over, to explain why treating this condition requires
cognitive as well as behavioral interventions. I suggest
that the overall picture derived from this phenomenolo-
gical perspective can also be communicated to GAD
patients, hopefully providing them with additional moti-
vation to find more helpful coping strategies than
worrying.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, I intro-
duce GAD and the concept of worrying which is central
in theorizing about GAD. Next, I present and discuss a
phenomenological account of ‘being in the world’. I
start out explaining some central Heideggerian notions
and then proceed to Wheeler’s radical interpretation of
these notions, articulated by the concept of ‘online intel-
ligence’. Then, I show how both accounts - theorizing
about worrying in GAD on the one hand and online
intelligence on the other - can be linked in order to
explain why worrying in GAD occurs and why it is
unhelpful. In brief, I suggest that in GAD there is a
metacognition that overrates the value of detached con-
templation about future situations while underrating the
value and resources of actual embodied-embedded
engagement.Correspondence: g.meynen@vu.nl
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2. GAD, worry, and metacognitions
GAD is an often chronic and impairing disorder with a
lifetime prevalence estimated to be up to 5% in the Uni-
ted States population [4,6]. The core symptom is exces-
sive or unreasonable worrying about all kinds of
situations and the worrying is difficult to control [3,7].
There is a 15-20% heritability in GAD [6] and, in gen-
eral, treatment options are cognitive behavioral therapy
(CBT) [2,8] as well as medication [9].
Adrian Wells defines worrying as consisting of long
chains of negative thoughts that are predominantly ver-
bal in form and aimed at problem solving [5]. The com-
mon type of worrying - ‘normal’ worrying without GAD
- is very similar in content to its GAD variant, but the
GAD-type is less controllable [5]. Wells developed a
model of worrying in GAD in which the concept of
metacognitive beliefs and appraisals is central [5]. In this
model, worrying is not just taken to be the natural con-
sequence of being anxious. Instead, the model tries to
explain why it is that the patient in an attempt to cope
with fearsome stimuli chooses the worry-strategy above
other coping options. Wells proposes that the reason
behind the patient’s choice is the presence of specific
metacognitions about worrying. Patients, in other words,
hold certain beliefs and appraisals about worrying that
make them start and continue to worry in response to
fearsome stimuli [10].
GAD patients do not worry all day; usually the worry-
ing is triggered by thoughts with intrusive character,
popping up in the patient’s mind. They often take the
form of “what if"-questions, like “what if I fail my
exam?”. Alternatively, they take the form of images of
disasters [10]. It is at this point, confronted with such
thoughts or images that metacognitive beliefs about the
helpfulness of worrying come into play. Examples of
such metacognitions are, as provided by Wells: “Worry-
ing helps me cope; worrying keeps me safe; if I worry
I’ll be prepared.” Such thoughts attach positive value to
worrying. This hypothesis is supported by the observa-
tion by clinicians that GAD patients often maintain that
worrying helps them to be prepared for negative out-
comes [11]. In addition, GAD patients indeed turn out
to believe that worrying is more helpful in finding solu-
tions and preventing negative outcomes as compared to
moderate worriers who do not fulfill GAD criteria [12].
GAD patients continue contemplating how to deal with
possible scenarios until, at some point, they somehow
feel that they will be able to cope. The assessment that
the worrying process can be ended is, for example,
based on internal cues like a “felt sense” that one is able
to cope should the feared scenario unfold, or it may be
related to some superstitious reasoning, or the worrying
may stop because the patient is distracted [10].
Given the fact that the worrying is rooted in certain
metacognitions (overarching ideas) attached to worrying,
it is clear that in CBT GAD patients should learn to
appreciate worrying differently. Wells discusses the case
(and successful therapy) of a 25 year old and says the
following about session 5 and 6 of this particular ther-
apy: “Exposure to worried about situations was imple-
mented (e.g., travelling alone, shopping alone) to test
the accuracy of worry content against perceptions of
real situations. This was intended to strengthen the
replacement meta-belief that worries are inaccurate and
therefore offer little advantage for coping.” [5]
One element should be added to this account of meta-
cognitions about worrying in GAD. As Riskind, referring
to Beck, says ([2], p.2), individuals vulnerable to devel-
oping GAD “overestimate the magnitude and severity of
threat, underestimate the extent of their coping
resources, and overuse compensatory self-protective
strategies such as cognitive, affective, or physical avoid-
ance.” [13] So, on such an account, GAD patients
underestimate their actual coping skills with respect to
real-life challenges [14]. In other words, in addition to
the ideas about the value of worrying in coping with
future situations, there is the underestimation of the
patient’s own capabilities for dealing with such situa-
tions should they occur.
It is characteristic for GAD patients not only to have
positive ideas about worrying. In fact, according to
Wells, these patients have negative thoughts about
worrying as well. They worry about worrying itself,
contemplating themes like: “I cannot control the wor-
rying” and “worrying is harmful”, “worrying means that
I could go crazy,” etcetera [5]. Wells calls these nega-
tive ideas about worrying ‘type 2’ worries. The worries
about all other things in life are the - common - type
1 worries [5]. In this paper, I focus on type 1 worries,
so the worries about future situations (and
catastrophes).
We should note that in some patients the reason for
worrying may be superstitious: Wells ([5], p. 303): “Such
meta-cognitive beliefs may be linked to superstitious
themes, such as not tempting fate through positive
thinking, or to beliefs that worry is a good way of deal-
ing with threat.” In this paper, however, I will not go
into the superstitious metacognitions, but concentrate
on the non-superstitious metacognition that worrying
somehow helps to prepare for future situations. In sec-
tion 4, I propose that the metacognition that makes
people choose for prolonged worrying as a coping strat-
egy can be linked to a view of human agency that over-
rates detached contemplation and underrates embodied-
embedded online intelligence in dealing with the world
(see also next section).
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3. Being-in-the-world and online intelligence
Phenomenologists, in particular the early Heidegger,
suggest to conceive of the human agent1 as being-in-
the-world [15]. What is clear from this term by itself is
that the world should not be conceived of as something
separate from the human being, but as intimately related
to what it is to be a human agent. Such a view stands in
contrast with an observant, detached ‘Cartesian Ego’
that mainly contemplates about the world, as Michael
Wheeler explains in more detail [16]. Furthermore, the
phenomenological tradition conceives of the human
being in practical interaction with the environment.
According to Merleau-Ponty [17], “[c]onsciousness is in
the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I
can’”. Notably, the ‘I can’ implies the possibility of
change in the actual world. While the ‘I think’ refers to
reflection about the world, the ‘I can’ acknowledges the
continuous potential for change.
The phenomenological focus on interaction with the
environment has resulted in specific terminology,
emphasizing that worldly entities appear first of all as
tools, as things that enable us to perform certain actions
([18], see also [19]). The objects are engaged in a way
that has already appreciated the possibilities, options, or
opportunities provided by these objects. Heidegger’s
famous example is his analysis of our appreciation of a
hammer [15]. The hammer is not primarily perceived as
a ‘thing’ with a wooden component and an iron part,
but it has already been perceived - before its parts are
recognized in their specific nature - as something which
enables us to hammer. In everyday life, we engage the
‘objects’ as enabling certain actions, and therefore,
indeed, as tools. Like when we are building, we pick up
the tools without much thought; we are engaged in a
certain praxis, which provides us with the practical eye
that makes us recognize the specific tools suitable for
the actions we intend to perform. In sum, we appreciate
the world from a perspective that continuously recog-
nizes actual possibilities for action.
The possibilities appreciated by the agent are not lim-
ited to one simple option [19]. Rather, we recognize a
range or network of options. Returning to the hammer,
this tool does not merely refer to the act of hammering;
it rather opens up further possibilities, like fixing things
and building a shed or a house. In fact, possibilities or
options go on infinitely, because every possibility opens
up a plethora of further possibilities [16]. In order to
acknowledge that it is not about isolated possibilities,
but about a range of interdependent options, Wheeler
uses the term involvement networks: “...the hammer is
involved in an act of hammering; that hammering is
involved in making something fast; and that making
something fast is involved in protecting the human
against bad weather.” [16] The analysis so far comes
down to a basically action-oriented approach to our
being in the world, in which practical options and possi-
bilities provided by the actual encounter with the envir-
onment constitute the primary level of our
understanding of the world.
Wheeler has integrated Heidegger’s phenomenological
analyses in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI) -
in part building on Dreyfus’s earlier work [20]. Wheeler
is certainly not merely using Heideggerian phenomeno-
logical notions. A clear example is the central role of
the body in Wheeler’s account. In Heidegger’s Being
and Time, the body is absent, as Heidegger himself
([15], p. 143) says: “This ‘bodily nature’ hides a whole
problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it
here.” Meanwhile, the body is to be found - and its role
emphasized - in the work of other representatives of the
phenomenological tradition, like Merleau-Ponty [17],
who was one of the sources for Dreyfus’s initial criticism
of AI [21] (see also [16], p. 167) that inspired Wheeler’s
account. So, Wheeler’s work is informed also by other
phenomenological strands (other than Heidegger)
enabling him to articulate the embodied nature of
human agency.
According to Wheeler, engagement with the world is
an ongoing adaptive process with continuous action-
oriented perception [16]. He understands the engaged
attitude toward the world as a form of ‘online intelli-
gence’: “A creature displays online intelligence just when
it produces a suite of fluid and flexible real-time adap-
tive responses to incoming sensory stimuli.” This formu-
lation shows a basic view of how both organisms
(humans included) and robots relate to their environ-
ment - and is, indeed, a radical interpretation and appli-
cation of some Heideggerian notions. Online
intelligence is especially relevant in a world that is con-
stantly changing, like our world. It is the opposite of off-
line intelligence: detached cognitive processes that are
not in immediate interaction with the world, like con-
templating the weather in Paris [16]. Offline intelligence,
in other words, is the opposite of embodied-embedded
cognitive activity. More can be said about such a dis-
tinction, and how it should be conceived of [22], but in
this paper I intend to use it in Wheeler’s sense.
For decades, Wheeler explains, people in AI tried to
build robots equipped with cognitive maps of the world:
these maps represented all kinds of aspects of the world.
Contrary to what was expected, such robots were not
able to smoothly interact with the environment. More
recently, other types of robots emerged. These robots
did not know that much about the world, but they were
designed to continuously pick up environmental cues
while interacting with the world. Without a precise
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representation of the world (so, without a map), but
equipped with the capacity to continuously sense the
world and interact with it, they are capable of smooth
interaction. For this kind of robots their specific bodily
features and abilities to interact are crucial [16]. So,
without an elaborate map, but equipped with some rele-
vant sensors, they are able to effectively interact with
their environment - in a way their clumsy and detached
predecessors were unable to.
In other words, an ‘online’ approach to the interaction
with the world has been helpful to AI and robotics. It
highlights that, contrary to what one might think, it is
the actual situation that is the enabler of options and
behavioral scenarios. In fact, AI for a long time over-
looked the specific nature and complexity of interacting
with the world. For example, three decades ago, IA spe-
cialists thought that the major challenge was building a
chess computer able to beat the world champion. But
beating a chess grandmaster - even the best of the
(human) world - turned out to be the easy part. The
real challenge was not this kind of cognitive activity, but
real-time, online interaction with the world, like ants,
mice, and falcons perform. Already several decades ago,
Hubert Dreyfus identified and explained the problems
and challenges in AI referring to Heideggerian notions
like ‘being-in-the-world’ [16,20,23]. His account brought
forward that interaction with the world is something
much different from what we theoretically anticipated -
still, in practice, we, as humans, are extremely good at it.
As indicated, the concept of online intelligence is inti-
mately related to ‘embodied-embedded cognitive
science’. Wheeler ([16], p. 11) says, “[i]n its raw form,
the embodied-embedded approach revolves around the
thought that cognitive science needs to put cognition
back in the brain, the brain back in the body, and the
body back in the world.” In my account I emphasize
cognition, body, and the environment - not the brain.
More in particular, I take the situated embodied nature
of our being in the world to be the core of online intelli-
gence within the context of this paper.
It is well established that the phenomenological tradi-
tion emphasizes the role of emotions in our being in the
world [19,24,25]. This has to be acknowledged when
considering profound disturbances of emotions - like in
anxiety disorders, GAD being an example - from a phe-
nomenological perspective. Heidegger, who also had a
particular interest in psychiatry [26,27], explains that
our engagement with the world is always taking place in
some mood [15]. Mood, like the weather, is always
there. We may be happy, sad, or anxious, but there is
always a mood in which we engage our environment.
And our mood is profoundly related to the actual
options we appreciate in the environment [15,25]. It is,
therefore, likely that anxious patients will appreciate and
perceive all kinds of smaller and bigger threats in their
environment because their mood makes them focus on
such dangerous possibilities. So, an anxious patient
won’t have much trouble finding things to worry about
and one could phenomenologically explore this issue
with respect to GAD. However, this is not the focus of
my paper; I take the ‘online intelligence’ angle on worry-
ing in GAD.
Notably, usually online and offline cognitive activity go
hand in hand: we combine these processes. In fact, in
our everyday activities it is about a balance between
these two, and about the ability to change one’s
approach in accordance with the task we perform.
In the next section I show how both accounts - con-
cerning the unhelpful worrying strategy on the one
hand and the online intelligence view on the other - can
be linked in a way that brings forward a deeper meta-
cognition in GAD: a metacognition about the nature of
our interaction with the world.
4. Offline worrying versus online interaction
In the light of the analysis so far, how should we charac-
terize worrying? It is a kind of thinking that takes a
detached, offline - disembodied and disembedded -
approach to future situations and scenarios that might
become reality. Patients overusing such offline intelli-
gence may be thinking all day about what it will be like
to go to a supermarket and interact with the cashiers -
whilst not actually going there but staying in bed
instead. And without any of the environmental input
that is in place in an actual supermarket, the patient can
easily go on worrying for hours. The embodied
approach recognizes and emphasizes that the human
bodily resources are richer than is consciously available
or accessible when detached contemplation is going on.
The body is the means of online intelligence, especially
equipped for actual engagement, not for offline contem-
plation about scenarios that may or may not become
reality. In fact, it is virtually impossible to make a cogni-
tive map for all events that may occur in a supermarket.
Relying on such detached knowledge about the environ-
ment made it hard for robots to smoothly deal with
their actual environment. Meanwhile, our online embo-
died cognitive capacities are perfectly capable of dealing
with a vast variety of situations at the moment they
occur. We are, as it appears, equipped for actual interac-
tion rather than for detached contemplation about such
interaction. This idea or ‘metacognition’ may be hard to
accept for GAD patients, as it took time for AI scholars
to accept its truth.
Let us take a further step. The metacognition with
respect to the value of worrying on the part of the
patient could be understood in the following terms: the
patient appears to believe somehow that the offline,
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rational cognitive capacities can more or less be identi-
fied with our capacities as a whole. The idea of the
human being is, in a way, equated with the rational Car-
tesian Ego: a detached mind, contemplating various sce-
narios. In contrast to such a Cartesian view of cognition
and rationality stands the twentieth century pragmatic
turn in phenomenology that focuses on actions (rather
than thoughts), body, and a world or environment in
flux (rather than the static object of detached contem-
plation). In other words, there is a parallel between the
approach to being in the world that an exemplary GAD
patient seems to take and a specific philosophical, Carte-
sian approach to the human agent. And since the GAD
patients are likely to avoid the feared circumstances, the
patients are (at least to some extent) deprived of the
opportunity to experience the richness of their resources
in actual online engagement. Consequently, their ‘Carte-
sian’ metacognition will remain uncorrected.
The gist of the analysis of the worrying process in
terms of offline intelligence is that there appears to be a
vital metacognition, namely that offline contemplation is
the means of choice for preparing for future situations -
ignoring the online cognitive and behavioral resources.
We also noted that GAD patients tend to underestimate
their ability to deal with whatever scenarios might
obtain in reality. Taking these together, I propose the
following perspective on worrying in GAD: These
patients may underestimate their coping skills in such
feared situations, because they tend to largely overlook
their embodied-embedded resources, while they are con-
vinced that detached contemplation is a helpful means
to deal with the world. In fact, overlooking the online
aspect of the human nature cannot but result in an
underestimation of the actual skills one possesses.
Although the focus of the present paper is on meta-
cognitions, it is important to note that GAD is not just
a cognitive stance on our interaction with the environ-
ment, but a disorder in which people are anxious, and,
therefore, a disorder that is about mood, emotions,
stress and distress. The burden to the patient will often
consist of - apart from avoidance - continuous anxiety
and stress. Still, in this paper I focus on unhelpful
(meta)cognitions, not on emotional distress.
It is clear that offline contemplation is not at all
wrong or bad in itself; it is merely the uncontrolled and
prolonged contemplation as it occurs in GAD that is
unproductive and unhelpful. In fact, since we are no
Cartesian Ego’s but embodied and embedded agents -
not going anywhere without our bodies - the contempla-
tion-strategy should be used selectively. We will never
be able to cognitively grasp completely how we do what
we do every day. Many of our own online capacities are
likely to remain a mystery to ourselves: we do not even
know how we raise our own arm. Thinking about
behavioral responses will never be the same as actual
engagement, and is, therefore, indeed, only of limited
value.
The worry-strategy is not only unproductive; it also
stimulates avoidance of the actual situations. I men-
tioned that the avoidance of feared situations indeed
deprives the patient of the opportunity to correct the
metacognition by showing that the patient can actually
deal with the situation. The (repeated) behavioral
experience that one is able to deal with actual situations
is probably the strongest means to achieve metacogni-
tive correction. This could also be part of the explana-
tion of why it is that the behavioral element of CBT is
successful in treating GAD [28]. In section 2, the case of
a 25 year old was mentioned and session 5 and 6 of
CBT contained a behavioral component: “Exposure to
worried about situations was implemented (e.g., travel-
ling alone, shopping alone) to test the accuracy of worry
content against perceptions of real situations. This was
intended to strengthen the replacement meta-belief that
worries are inaccurate and therefore offer little advan-
tage for coping.” [5] Such a behavioral approach is com-
pletely understandable from the phenomenological
perspective proposed in this paper. Online intelligence
should be experienced and performed as a means to
achieve correction of the metacognitions.
A specific behavioral aspect of CBT in anxiety disor-
ders in general could also be explained from an embo-
died-embedded perspective. Anxiety patients may be
afraid that they will be overwhelmed by anxiety in the
feared or worried about situations. And these patients
are right (at least in part): in such feared situations anxi-
ety levels will increase, and usually these patients will
flee from the situation as soon as possible. Yet, in CBT,
anxiety patients are motivated to expose themselves to
such stressful situations without fleeing. In such cases
anxiety levels will initially increase - but since patients
are not fleeing from the stressor, they will experience
that the (extreme) anxiety levels eventually drop (often
they decrease after, let’s say, 10-20 minutes). Thus, CBT
enables the patients to experience their bodily responses
and to find out that, after a period of time, anxiety levels
actually decrease in the feared situation. There is ample
evidence for the effectiveness of this exposure compo-
nent of CBT [29]. On the phenomenological account
developed so far, this is just one example of our adap-
tive, online bodily capacities and responses. Our body
adapts - physiological anxiety responses decrease - to a
situation in a way a worrying patient might well over-
look. In fact, our bodily responses, like the physical
responses to stressors, are not static, but dynamic in
nature, and aimed at effective coping. The behavioral
component of CBT, therefore, shows the patients their
own online responses to the feared situation.
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Phenomenologically informed research has provided
evidence that ‘disembodiment’ is a problem in several
psychiatric disorders, like schizophrenia and melancholia
[30,31]. In such cases of a ‘disembodied mind’ there is a
bodily (mediated) disconnect between the mind and the
environment. For instance, in melancholia patients may
feel completely alienated from the world, not ‘in touch’
with it anymore. Still, there is a difference between this
kind of ‘disembodiment’ and the approach to GAD
developed in the present paper. For this paper is not
about actual disembodiment or perceptual changes in
GAD, but about metacognitions on the part of the
patient pertaining to his interaction with the environ-
ment. In other words, in (more severe) disorders like
schizophrenia, there are actual (developmental) changes
in bodily interaction with the world, whilst in GAD the
main problem concerns metacognitions about how to
deal with future situations. Meanwhile, it would be
interesting to study GAD in the way that has been done
in melancholia and schizophrenia[32], aiming to find
signs of actual, e.g., perceptual disembodiment.
The idea put forward in this paper could also be
explained to patients, I suggest. In brief, a therapist
could say something like this to the patient: “You are
more resourceful than you think you are, because you
focus and rely on detached contemplation skills. In fact,
however, you are ignoring that you are a human being,
which means a being that has the specific ability to deal
with real life situations rather than with contemplated
ones. Granted, detached deliberation and contemplation
are indispensible features of our being in the world. Yet,
their value is limited; as soon as contemplation takes
over and becomes uncontrollable - becomes worrying -,
your cognitive endeavors stop adding to your resources
in real life situations. Part of the therapy will be to
experience your own behavioral resources in the situa-
tions you fear. We will do this gradually, but over time
you will be surprised by your own capacities in dealing
with actual situations.” Explaining this view to patients
might help motivating them to, indeed, engage bodily -
instead of via worrisome imagination - in (feared) situa-
tions, and experience their own adaptive skills. In addi-
tion, providing patients with this overall picture might
encourage them to identify specific aspects of their own
behavioral responses in the feared situation that were
unanticipated, i.e., overlooked in the worry-scenarios -
yet were effective in dealing with the stressor. Identify-
ing such elements of their own behavior could deepen
their belief that worrying is not a helpful strategy.
Still, the emphasis on correcting the metacognition
about how to deal with the world, should not suggest
that other metacognitive corrections are irrelevant when
treating GAD. Usually, in CBT, the therapist and the
patient identify various (meta)cognitions that contribute
to the GAD symptoms in that particular patient. Identi-
fying and correcting these specific (meta)cognitions is a
powerful part of CBT. Meanwhile, I suggest that there
appears to be an overarching or deep metacognition
which ignores the resources of online intelligence. Cor-
recting this metacognition could be part of CBT as well.
5. Conclusions
GAD patients hold certain metacognitions, circling
around the value of worrying as a way of preparing for
future events. Such metacognitions are shared by many
people, but in GAD they are more extreme. In addition,
GAD patients tend to underrate their own coping skills
should the feared situation occur. I related these phe-
nomena to a philosophical - ‘Cartesian’ - position that
concentrates on rational deliberation, while (at least in
part) ignoring our embodied-embedded existence. More
specifically, from the perspective of an online account,
the GAD-metacognitions are in fact mistakes about
what we are. Like philosophers tended to ignore the
body as well as the environment (embeddedness), GAD
patients tend to either ignore or underrate the embo-
died-embedded skills human agents naturally have.
From this biased perspective it becomes understandable
that people start figuring out all kinds of scenarios in a
detached offline fashion and at the same time tend to
avoid the actual situation just as long as they do not feel
that they have worked out all sorts of eventualities. The
online intelligence approach, however, acknowledges
that, indeed, the future is uncertain (the world being in
flux). Meanwhile, at some point detached contemplation
adds very little to our coping resources; its value is
limited.
The proposed view adds to our understanding of why
CBT is effective in these patients: on the one hand it
aims at direct cognitive correction of the relevant GAD-
metacognitions; on the other hand its behavioral com-
ponent provides the GAD patients with the experience
that their resources are much richer than prolonged
(fearful) offline contemplation can imagine.
Since many people value worrying to some extent and
many people do it from time to time, it might be that
more people do not fully realize the limitations of offline
contemplation on the one hand and the resources of
online intelligence in dealing with our world on the
other.
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1. In technical terms ‘being-there’ [German: Dasein]. Wheeler ([16], p. 122)
uses the term “human agency” and “the human agent”. For the analysis and
interpretation of ‘being-in-the-world’ and Wheeler’s account as developed in
this section, see also [19].
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